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ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
LAW & POPULAR CULTURE
INTRODUCTION
John T. Nockleby*
The contributors to this Symposium all share a common
perspective that law can only be understood as situated within
popular culture, and is both reflective of and constitutive of that
culture.' The contributors offer multiple ways in which law and
literature or law and film relate to each other. Some read law as
literature. Some focus on how law is portrayed in film. Others
reflect on the effect that film and pop culture have on how law is
practiced.
We have grouped the articles into three sections on the basis of
their dominant themes. First, several essays examine culture in law
and law as culture at the same time. These essayists read legal texts
as though they are cultural texts, such as literature or film. The
essays by Professors Silbey,2 Chase, 3 and Murray 4 are in this section.
A second group of contributors do not interpret legal texts, such
as cases for their literary or narrative features. Rather, they examine
how cultural texts themselves portray law. Thus, Professors
Bandes, 5 Asimow,6 and Austin7 explore films about law. These
authors critique these films by asking how they frame common legal
* Professor of Law & Director, Civil Justice Program, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. See Jessica Silbey, Truth Tales and Trial Films, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551, 552 & nn.7-
8 (2007).
2. Id. at 551.
3. Anthony Chase, The Mass Culture of Property, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 589 (2007).
4. Yxta Murray, A Lecture on Plessy v. Ferguson as Oedipus Rex, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
611 (2007).
5. Susan Bandes, We Lost It at the Movies: The Rule of Law Goes from Washington to
Hollywood and Back Again, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 621 (2007).
6. Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 653
(2007).
7. Regina Austin, Super Size Me and the Conundrum of Race/Ethnicity, Gender, and Class
for the Contemporary Law-Genre Documentary Filmmaker, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 687 (2007).
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issues. Professor Sherwin's contribution, 8 also in this section, notes
that cultural representations about law have become so profoundly
important that legal actors such as judges and lawyers must become
be aware of these representations as they engage with the law.
And finally, Professor Elkins's essay 9 asks whether or not legal
actors are uniquely insightful when they critique films and other
cultural texts that deal with law. He asks us to examine their claim
to particular expertise in this domain with great care.
I. CULTURE IN LAW AND LAW AS CULTURE
In the opening piece, Professor Jessica Silbey lays out an
illuminating taxonomy of law and cultural studies. In this map,
Professor Silbey contrasts the study of law in literature and law as
literature. She then shows that law/film and law/literature studies are
subsets of the wider discipline of cultural studies. Silbey argues that
fictionalized films based on famous trials whose verdicts are well
known, which she calls truth tales, encourage the viewer to reflect on
the law's function in society. Because the viewer already knows the
trial's outcome, the film's story extends beyond the courtroom.
Through this wider framing, truth tales work to comment on the legal
system's promise of delivering justice.
Silbey illustrates her idea by analyzing two trial films,
Compulsion and Swoon, which were both made about the famous
1924 Leopold-Loeb murder case. In Compulsion, the film's focus is
on the hypocrisy of a legal system that responds to murder by
inflicting the death penalty.
This is a stark contrast to Swoon, which focuses on the
homoerotic relationship between Leopold and Loeb. Rather than the
injustice of capital punishment, the second film highlights how anti-
Semitism and homophobia can distort justice. The differences
between Compulsion and Swoon illustrate Silbey's point that the
primary effect of truth tales is to foreground the changing social
meaning of verdicts over time.
Anthony Chase also explores film to gain insight on the cultural
power of law. More than twenty years ago, Chase told us that the
8. Richard K. Sherwin, A Manifesto for Visual Legal Realism, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 719
(2007).
9. James R. Elkins, Popular Culture, Legal Films, and Legal Film Critics, 40 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 745 (2007).
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legal academy was not paying enough attention to the depiction of
law and lawyers in popular culture." He argued that critical scholars
could learn much from popular culture about ideologies that
legitimate power.
In this symposium, Chase reflects upon a basic contradiction in
current American property law: on the one hand, the idea that use of
private property should be unrestrained, and on the other, the idea
that private property should be subject to public regulation and
communitarian norms.
Chase explores this tension in "property" by examining several
films that both portray and exploit it in their narrative structure.
Chase's suggestion is that filmmakers regularly grapple with tensions
between competing ideals, and thus the critical lawyer who studies
them can gain insight about parallel contradictions within law.
In the third article in this section, Professor Yxta Murray, a
novelist herself, writes about literature rather than film. In the
conventional view, according to Murray, law imposes order while
literature erupts from the imagination. Law is formal, rigid, and
logical; literature impulsive, fanciful and intuitive. So, Murray says,
it is no surprise that the law and literature movement often sees itself
as discovering obscure similarities between legal texts and the
writer's art or studies literature for what it says about the law.
However, Murray wants to examine the relationship of law and
literature from a different vantage point. From Murray's perspective,
law is literature. In her view, the same impulses that shape literature
animate law texts. Law and literature derive from the same source,
our imagination. Both mediums have tragic figures whose stories
ultimately create emotional catharsis.
To illustrate the "profound relatedness" of those formally
different disciplines, literature and law, Murray reads twin tragedies,
Oedipus Rex and Plessy v. Ferguson. She wants to show that
Oedipus is both law and tragedy, and Plessy both tragic art and law.
The tragic flaw in Oedipus, hubris, leads to his downfall, just as
the truth-teller, the Oracle, foretold. In Plessy, the Supreme Court-
standing in for the Oracle-pronounces powerful "truths": that
Plessy is "black," despite his claims that he's 7/8ths "white" and
10. Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WISC. L. REV. 527
(1986); Anthony Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media Portrayals of
American Attorneys, 1986 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 281 (1986).
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therefore entitled to all the privileges of being "white" entails-
including not being forced to segregate. The Oracle/Court
announces that Plessy must abide the state's decree that he live under
all the legal disabilities the state inflicts on people defined as
"colored." Like Oedipus, Plessy has lost control of his life, having
been defined by the legal authorities. We experience both as tragic
figures.
In concluding, Murray says law is a work of imagination. We
use law to cabin our fears, and we employ legal categories to
construct relationships with each other. As much as some might
imagine that law as applied to humans in their activities is different
from other narrative constructs, Murray's goal is to establish their
commonness.
II. LAW IN CULTURE
A different focus emerges from our second set of Symposium
authors. Professors Susan Bandes, Regina Austin, Michael Asimow,
and Richard Sherwin all address film and visual portrayals of key
cultural tropes. Together, all four papers help us understand better
how legal narratives derived from our visual culture can obscure or
illuminate key facets of the legal system.
In her Article, Professor Susan Bandes explores the connection
between the depiction of the judicial role in popular media such as
movies and television and the caricature of judging that still holds
sway in more serious non-fiction venues like Senate confirmation
hearings and political campaigns.
Popular culture tends to create stock images, characters with
which we become familiar. In popular venues, Bandes argues, the
"judge" is generally depicted either as (1) a neutral or invisible
placeholder for a fixed and determinate rule of law (which we might
call the cultural "good judge"), or (2) as biased, vulgar, or downright
villainous (the cultural "bad judge"). In the popular conception, the
judge as the creator-of-rules is nowhere to be found.
This phenomenon-that judges as legitimate lawmakers is
foreign to pop cultural portrayals of judging-should at one level
strike us as puzzling. The idea of the judge-as-lawmaker has been
with us for centuries, even if current popular cultural portrayals do
not acknowledge that.
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For example, Blackstone's 18th-century-era Commentaries on
the Law of England1" comprehensively surveys common law rules
but pays scant attention to the "idea" of the judge-as-lawmaker. To
Blackstone, rulemaking by judges is as legitimate as it is generally to
us that legislation trumps common law rules. Indeed, Lawrence
Friedman tells us, the "highest source" of law for Blackstone was not
legislative enactment, but "'general custom,' as reflected in the
decisions of the common-law judges."' 2
Despite this history, contemporary depictions of judging
obscures judicial rulemaking, as Bandes's article relates. What
should we make of the failure of popular culture to address this
fundamental judicial role? 3
Bandes draws upon the work of Robert Ferguson and Robert
Cover to explore a number of possible reasons. For example, the
formalist nature of the well-crafted judicial opinion seeks to achieve
a tone of inevitability, suggesting that the judge has no choice in
making the decision. The goal is to appear "neutral," a force without
politics.
The prevailing notion of judges and judging that currently
dominates the cultural discourse is simple ideology, according to
Bandes. It not only claims priority over other possible images of the
judicial role, but because it is invisible it seems both inevitable and
not subject to critique.
Like Bandes, Professor Michael Asimow is also interested in
popular portrayals of legal actors. In contrast to Bandes's focus on
11. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
12. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 21 (2d ed. 1985). In
Blackstone's era, judicial rule-making was legitimated by the mythology that law judges were
"oracles", BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *69, whose pronouncements derived as though from a
sacred text. To the 18th-century mind, judges "discovered" law, or at most drew upon existing
principles. "In theory ... judges drew their decisions from existing principles of law; ultimately
these principles reflected the living values, attitudes, and ethical ideas of the English people."
FRIEDMAN, supra. It took Holmes and the Realists a half-century to dislodge from lawyers'
minds the notion that in common law adjudication judges merely "discovered" and "applied" law.
13. This question does not fall prey to what James Elkins refers to as the "inaccuracy"
thesis-namely the critique of popular culture that it doesn't "accurately" represent the role of
judges in the legal system. Bandes's point is not that portrayals of judges are merely inaccurate.
Rather, she contends that our inability to visualize judges in their lawmaking role reflects an
ideological stance. It's not that the portrayal of judging as either judge-as-umpire or judge-as-
corrupt is inaccurate; it's that we don't "see" the judge-as-rule-maker when we visualize the idea
of "judge."
Winter 2007]
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images of judging Asimow draws our attention to a puzzle involving
depictions of lawyers.
The puzzle is this: if the American public distrusts lawyers more
than all professionals and holds judges in higher esteem, then why do
Americans believe strongly in the adversarial system, where lawyers
make all the important procedural decisions during trials?
Asimow discusses possible reasons for this paradox but focuses
on one in particular: the influence of popular cultural portrayals of
the trial process. This reason is rooted in "cultivation theory," which
proposes that people often form opinions based on the fictitious
stories of pop culture media.
In Asimow's view, the popular television show Perry Mason
greatly influenced how the public looks at lawyers. Perry Mason
taught media consumers that the adversary system delivers the truth.
Even though Americans hate and distrust lawyers, they want a good
one by their side. Countless films and television shows since Perry
Mason's day have conveyed the same basic message, solidifying
Americans' bone-deep belief in the adversary system.
In sum, since Americans learn about the justice system from
popular portrayals of it, it should not surprise us that they embrace
the cultural icons that make up the pop culture's legal landscape.
Bandes shows us how cultural portrayals of judging constrain our
discourse about judges. Similarly, Asimow shows how the media
construction of Perry Mason has enhanced the adversarial role of
lawyers.
Like Bandes and Asimow, Professor Regina Austin is also
interested in popular cultural representations. However, much like
critical race theorists and feminist legal scholars transformed how
legal scholars understand law's effects on society, Austin brings a
critical race & critical feminist perspective to bear on popular
culture. She wants us to look especially at how cultural factors-the
context in which certain stories arose-might be missing from films
we see.
To situate Austin's critique, let us recall that many fiction films
have been made about civil litigation, among them A Civil Action
and Erin Brockovich."4 Such films often follow standard story lines
14. Chase develops what he terms the "master narrative" of cinematic portrayals of tort law
in four films, THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982), CLASS ACTION (20th Century Fox 1991),
PHILADELPHIA (Clinica Estetico Ltd. 1993), and THE RAINMAKER (American Zoetrope 1997).
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involving conflicts between an average citizen and a powerful but
irresponsible institution.
Film documentaries that examine powerful institutions
sometimes employ a similar critique, but often their focus is not
explicitly on law or legal rights, but on putatively anti-social (though
not necessarily illegal) behavior of large corporate institutions. 5
Morgan Spurlock's popular documentary film Super Size Me, about
fatty McDonald's restaurant food, follows this path.
In her Symposium Article, Austin examines how Spurlock's
film ignores several factors that might actually have made his film
much more situated in the culture, including the impact of race,
gender, and socioeconomic status on "super-sized" Americans.
Although Spurlock's film was initially inspired by a highly
publicized lawsuit in which two African-American teenage girls
from the Bronx allege that eating McDonald's food caused them to
become obese and to suffer from obesity-related medical ailments,
Austin notes that Spurlock neglects to address how racial, gender and
socioeconomic cultural values and norms interact to affect rates of
obesity in America.
Austin's critique of Super Size Me offers several hypotheses for
why poorer minorities, especially women, are more likely to be
obese than affluent white Americans based on consumption of fast
food. For example, fast food restaurants are cheaper and oftentimes
more abundant than grocery stores in poorer communities; they are
safe, and clean; they offer a family an inexpensive experience
outside the home; they save time for tired and overworked parents. 6
Furthermore, cultural differences between white and black
Americans may also have an impact on higher obesity rates in the
minority population.
We can analogize Austin's critique to that posed by critical race
and gender theorists to law more generally. The "frames" chosen to
describe legal issues present in a given controversy often obscure the
role of race, class or gender. This is true even for "frames" chosen
by those who are critical of law or popular culture.
See ANTHONY CHASE, MOVIES ON TRIAL: THE LEGAL SYSTEM ON THE SILVER SCREEN 108
(2002).
15. See Austin, supra note 7, at 691-92 & nn.16-23.
16. Austin may be referring here to decades of work by community activists and lawyers to
find ways to ensure healthier food is available in impoverished communities.
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Similarly, Austin notes, the frame chosen by Spurlock affects
how we see obesity. Spurlock critiques corporate advertising and
obliviousness to the unhealthful bodies that would result from
reliance on fast food. But, as Austin cogently explains, Spurlock
nowhere examines the disparate impact on impoverished
communities, many of which are majority minority, and communities
in which working women have few healthy food choices.
Finally, Austin reflects on the difficulties that filmmakers of
particular (elite?) backgrounds may have in contextualizing
documentaries to take into account poverty and race. In an earlier
article, Austin examined how "Law-Genre Documentaries" could be
employed in the service of public interest advocacy. 7 She made the
point that documentarians who engage in activism have to overcome
the challenge of behaving paternalistically towards their subjects,
while maintaining fidelity to their craft.
The concluding challenge posed by Austin to documentary
filmmakers in both this and her earlier article is to address the reality
of poverty and race without either meddling, or treating their subjects
paternalistically.
The last piece in this section, A Manifesto for Visual Legal
Realism, concludes with a call to lawyers and legal scholars.
According to Professor Richard Sherwin, for generations at least
some legal scholars saw law as an autonomous discipline, separate
from culture, with its own distinctive style of reasoning and
discourse."5 Consistent with the views of other scholars writing for
this Symposium issue, Sherwin argues that these supposedly
"autonomous" disciplines were never very autonomous in fact.
Focusing attention on language, images, and communications,
Professor Richard Sherwin urges that lawyers need to understand the
17. Regina Austin, The "Next New Wave": Law-Genre Documentaries, Lawyering in
Support of the Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 809 (2006).
18. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). However, in contrast to Posner, I would suggest that the idea of
the autonomy of law is associated with 19th-century American Classical Legal Thought, whose
decline as a mode of reasoning could be dated to key writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, such as
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897), and Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1894), date the "decline" of the view that law was autonomous (or, more accurately
perhaps, the rise of legal realism) to a much earlier time. See generally Introduction to THE
CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1, 1-18 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds.,
2007).
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fluidity between law and popular culture. The borders between the
two are porous; law bleeds into popular culture, and the feedback
loop ensures that culture deeply influences the meaning and
discourses of law.
For more than a decade, Sherwin has been advocating a new
breed of scholarship that explores techniques of persuasion and
framing, particularly by examining how visual technologies change
the very nature of how we learn. 9 Sherwin's core insight is that
proliferating technologies of communication are transforming the
way people map language, social cues, and visual stimuli. The form
in which a given communication takes is transforming the substance
of what is conveyed.
Sherwin thus calls for a deeper scholarly understanding of visual
knowledge. Visual learning is nonlinear. When we see images, our
brains work in associational rather than logical ways. More than
written or oral communications, visual images call for emotional
responses. Sherwin argues that lawyers need to understand better
how technologies of the internet, film and television are changing
how people learn.
Announcing a "manifesto for visual legal realism," Sherwin
calls attention to the profound effect of visual culture and multi-
modal communication technologies on legal practice. This effect is
clearly evident in persuasion techniques by practicing attorneys, who
borrow from well-known film or television conceits in both their
rhetoric and visual exhibits. It is also present in the minds of jurors,
whose decision-making suggests influence by memes from popular
culture (and the attorneys that exploit them). Acknowledging this
influence is important to effectively confront any knowledge gaps or
distortions it may cause.
III. CRITIQUING LEGAL FILM CRITICISM
A symposium on popular culture and law should also ask
penetrating questions about cultural scholarship itself. For example,
what does legal film criticism help us understand?
Professor James Elkins performs the task for us. He offers a sort
of historiography of film criticism, to examine what he describes as
19. Sherwin does this through his website, Visual Persuasion Project, http://www.nyls.edu/
pages/2734.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
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"the new 'law and film' scholars, to see how they engage legal
films."°
Elkins takes as his texts two types of lawyer-in-film criticism:
first, Elkins challenges the "reality critique"-the supposition by
some legal scholars that law as portrayed on screen inaccurately
represents law, lawyers, or the "legal system."'" As described by
Elkins, the "reality critique"
is, at once, a reassuring move for legal film critics-it...
draw[s] on a purported expertise the lay viewer does not
have-and it represents a substantial failure. The problem
with the reality critique is that it props up and maintains a
convention of legal film criticism that leaves us thinking we
are film critics when what we are doing is defending the
legal profession.22
Elkins's point is not so much that the reality critique is faulty, but
that it is uninteresting. 3 So what if a film doesn't mention the
distinction between trial judges and appellate judges, or gets "the
law" wrong?
In Elkins's view, "reality criticism" does not contend with film
as art; it impedes confronting the text and drama as it unfolds.
Focusing on legal "inaccuracy" absolves the legal scholar from true
film criticism, such as how a film may indeed embody "truth"
despite its infidelities to law-as-known-by-lawyers. The reality
critique obscures the meaning of lawyer films even as it purports to
be essential to their critical evaluation. It leaves us with an
inadequate understanding of a film as a film, as a story, as a drama
with meaning, as a struggle to tell stories about justice.
Turning to his second subject, Philip Meyer, Elkins quotes
Meyer's view on the relationship between the trial and the film about
law:
Like the movie-maker, the trial attorney is an oral cultural
storyteller who tells fact-based narratives that convey a
story and a particular vision of the world. The principles of
narrative ordination for a trial storyteller are like the
20. See Elkins, supra note 9, at 754.
21. Elkins chooses the work of David Raye Papke to illustrate this thesis. See id. at 755.
22. Id. at 767 (footnote omitted).
23. Cf id. at 780-81.
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aesthetic structures that compel movie directors to craft
stories along a tightly ordered narrative spine.24
To Meyer, the trial attorney and movie director share important
characteristics: both portray events in an external world. Elkins is
sympathetic to this view, for it treats filmmaking and lawyering both
as crafts. Both the filmmaker and the trial lawyer use narrative
devices in telling a story; both seek to exploit common frames of
understanding.
But film criticism for lawyers can't be just about learning to be
better lawyers, or to learn how to tell better stories. Elkins suggests
also that the legal film critic's ultimate goal must be to unsettle our
conventional selves, to attempt to understand how justice might or
might not unfold, and to challenge conventional views of lawyering.
Legal film critics should therefore view films about law like other
films, as stories or dramas with meaning, as struggles about justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
The articles that make up this Symposium all address the subject
of law and culture from the perspective that the "border" between the
two is fluid. Literature tells stories, as do our law cases. Law is
influencing film and literature, and culture is rebounding on law.
The aspiration of a Symposium like this is to add perspective;
not definitively to resolve questions but to bring multiple views to
bear on a complex relationship. The articles that follow offer unique
contributions to studies of law and literature and law and film. We
hope you enjoy them.
24. Id. at 769 (quoting Philip N. Meyer, Law Students Go to the Movies, 24 CONN. L. REV.
893, 897-98 (1994)).
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